Strategy is a theory of victory; grand strategy is a theory of security. In the ideal, a state’s strategy and grand strategy are mutually reinforcing. Wartime decisions should leave the state more secure in the aftermath, and peacetime decisions should put the state in a good position in the event of future conflict. Yet for various reasons, strategy and grand strategy often drift apart.

SIS Professor Josh Rovner's new article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, "History is written by the losers: Strategy and grand strategy in the aftermath of war," focuses on one type of decoupling. Victorious states tend to expand their grand strategic ambitions, yet nostalgia encourages them to retain increasingly outmoded strategic concepts. Losers, by contrast, are more likely to have frank conversations about the real opportunities and limits of state power, and the ways in which military action can provide meaningful support. Rovner illustrates the argument with case studies from the British experience in the American War of Independence, and the American experience in the first Persian Gulf War.

Joshua Rovner (2024) History is written by the losers: Strategy and grand strategy in the aftermath of war, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2024.2321604