CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW SECURITY CONTEXT: THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

Part I: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

Part II: Preventing and Resolving Conflict in Macedonia

Part III: Analysis and Conclusions about the Conflict in Macedonia

CHAPTER 1: FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: A SHIFT IN PARADIGM

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We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…and for these ends…to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, except in the common interest…
-Preamble to the UN Charter

You've created an international crisis, that's why I've come to see you.
-Kissinger to Sadat, November 1973 (el-Sadat 1977: 267)

We cannot careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises.
-Warren Christopher (Lund 1996)[2]

Introduction

The international community has often responded to crises and threats to international peace in a reactive, ad hoc manner. Policymakers and theorists interested in conflict resolution today are in broad agreement that preventing violent conflicts is generally preferable to post hoc responses, i.e., after the outbreak of violence. Thus a relatively new conceptual emphasis on conflict prevention has emerged that, in theory at least, provides the logic for peacemaking action prior to an outbreak of internal or international armed violence. In practice, conflicts metamorphose constantly and can go from relative calm to dormancy to massive violence. While a chronological sequencing of international peacemaking efforts has logical appeal, realities on the ground make the *intentionality* and *design* of preventive action more relevant to conflict resolution and peacemaking

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[2] Warren Christopher, as Secretary of State designate, Testimony during his Senate Confirmation Hearing, cited in Lund (1996).

than the timing and sequencing question of *when* the preventive action actually takes place (although timing is clearly important).

Conflict prevention is defined here as a range of policy actions and instruments designed to 1) either prevent a foreseen, perhaps imminent, *initial* outbreak of violence, *or* 2) to prevent the recurrence of violence after it has been halted, *or* 3) to prevent its further escalation after it has been contained. As the international security environment has undergone important transitions since the end of the Cold War, a preventive approach has gained in importance as well, for reasons we discuss in this chapter and throughout the present work.

Conflict prevention is a concept that supports a number of strategic policy actions that seek to prevent an outbreak, escalation or return to violent conflict. Preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment are the two major areas of purposeful action and in each category there are variations. Preventive diplomacy can include the dispatch of high level envoys from a regional or international organization or state to a conflict zone in order to assist the conflict parties to change perceptions and take de-escalatory actions in the conflict they are engaged in. States and IOs are not the only actors; NGOs, religious organizations and eminent persons acting on their own but in coordination with others can have the same purpose. Regardless of the actor or level of engagement, the principal tool is negotiation or mediation. Preventive military deployments also have a range of possible configurations ranging from humanitarian protection, observation and monitoring of demilitarization, reporting on human rights violations, accompaniment in

the return of displaced populations, as well as robust deployments of combat troops for the purpose of deterring an armed conflict or enforcing the terms of a peace settlement or other mandate.

In contrast with the diplomatic and military approaches to prevention, it has been widely argued that development work can be oriented toward the underlying "root" causes of conflicts in such a way that a conflict-prone region or state will be able to escape the onset and escalation of violent conflict. Scholars and practitioners refer to this variant as "structural prevention" and given its conceptual overlap with development and peacebuilding, we do not address it here, limiting ourselves to the diplomatic - military variants.

Peacemaking in all of its facets, whether done by statesmen and diplomats, the military, humanitarian workers or eminent individuals, is conducted under conditions of complexity. The sheer number of intervenors, the multiplicity and fractious nature of conflict parties (especially armed non-state groups) and the shifting political and economic terrain on which all of these operate virtually assure that both the process and outcomes of peace efforts are plagued by uncertainties. History is strewn with cases of extraordinary peacemaking efforts that nevertheless were undermined by parties internal or external to the conflict. Given the extraordinary challenges of making peace during or after violent conflict, the capacity to predict and actually prevent conflict is intrinsically appealing.

Conflict prevention, as an organized set of activities in favor of the preservation or consolidation of peace, marks a shift from the realist paradigm that emphasized international politics by crisis management (see the quote above attributed to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) to a more critical and nuanced approach that at the very least seeks to pre-empt violence or massive escalation of violence, and in some cases, seeks to go so far as to redress the root causes of violence before it erupts.

Crisis Management versus Conflict Prevention

Prior to the October 1973 war in the Middle East, Egypt and the United States had no formal relations. Egypt was, however, seeking to get the US to play an intermediary role and broker a peace settlement. In secret back channel encounters in February and May 1973, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger signaled to his Egyptian counterpart Hafiz Ismail, that "the United States regrettably could do nothing so long as [Egypt] was the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority (el-Sadat 1977: 238)."

Sadat had re-oriented Egypt's foreign policy away out of the Soviet sphere and inched toward the US, believing that *only the US* could accomplish three goals: first, bring Israeli decision makers to the peace table; second, deliver a 'land for peace' bargain in which Israel would return the Arab territories it occupied since the June 1967 Middle East War; and third, as the critical consequence of the first two, prevent a further war in the region. But Kissinger was deeply stuck in the assumption that US diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East could best be leveraged if the parties were facing an imminent or emerging crisis. In doing so, he virtually assured that the fourth regional war

(the October 1973 War) would be fought in the Middle East.[3] In his pursuit of 'balancing', it can be appreciated that Kissinger's goals were not about preventing the 1973 war (which took Kissinger by surprise even though he had heard Sadat openly warning about it for the three years preceding). His diplomacy in the wake of the conflagration was unapologetically concerned with using the outbreak of violence to further US strategic goals in the Middle East (Kissinger 1982).

In essence, Kissinger was operating according to the logic of crisis management. The prevention of international crises and wars operates according to a very different kind of logic, and to understand how conflict prevention is a conceptual challenge to crisis management, it is necessary to understand both.

Kissinger's energetic diplomacy in the aftermath of that war was brilliant and strategic with regard to US interests as he defined them especially with regard to sidelining Soviet support for Arab nationalism. Nevertheless it was a product of the original assumption: there was no vision for a new regional order or bold initiatives. He played the shuttle diplomat himself, achieving only the smallest territorial adjustments for Syria and Egypt and no comprehensive peace for Israel, Syria or Egypt. It can legitimately be argued that the Egyptian military offensive—however costly—was a necessary precursor to later diplomatic movement and that it significantly modified both the US and Israeli assessment of Sadat as leader and statesman. But at what cost? Syria and Israel would not seriously entertain peace talks with each other until nearly two decades and further

[3] The regional wars of the Middle East in the post- World War II era are the war between Arab and Jewish nationalist forces in British Mandate Palestine (1945-1948), which led directly to the ensuing war between the Israeli state and the surrounding Arab states (1948), the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 War (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria), the 1973 War (Syria, Egypt, Israel), the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1991), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). Connected with these have been other conflicts, including the Palestinian uprisings of 1987-1993 and 2001-present, the conflicts between the PLO and Jordan, between the PLO and Syria, the 1996 and 2006 confrontations between Israel and Hezb'allah in Lebanon.

regional wars (the Lebanese civil war and the Persian Gulf Crisis) had passed. Sadat had to wait until the next US administration under President Carter, who brought Egypt and Israel into a comprehensive peace agreement that has successfully prevented further Egypt-Israel wars. The other dimensions of the regional conflict remained unchanged however because the Camp David Accords provisions for addressing the core, underlying Palestinian-Israeli conflict remained unimplemented.

The numerous intrastate wars that were fought during, and especially after, the Cold War, with their consequent humanitarian emergencies, genocidal violence, massive cross-border refugee flows, and other threats such as state collapse all gave impetus to the new emphasis on prevention that revealed a certain fatigue with the classic approaches.

The assumptions underlying conflict prevention as a peace-oriented practice are straightforward enough: Efforts by conflict parties or third party intervenors to insure that expected or feared hostilities do not break out. To do so, a number of instruments need to used: detection and early warning of an impending violent conflict, accurate analysis of the conflict data, mobilization of political will regardless of the forum (states, IOs, regional organizations or NGOs), expertly deployed diplomatic intervention to help conflict parties find alternative means to achieve political goals, and possible military deployments to deter armed conflict onset or escalation, or to monitor military movements and human rights violations, among other instruments. The novelty is not so much in the instruments themselves as in the intention of policymakers to use them in a preventive capacity.

The Emergence of Conflict Prevention

The practice and study of conflict prevention have burgeoned in recent decades. The Council on Foreign Relations created its "Center for Preventive Action" and the Carnegie Corporation's Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict gathered researchers and practitioners from all over the global political spectrum and began promoting reflection, teaching, research and diplomacy all premised on the assumption that conflict could and indeed should be prevented. The Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) founded a Center for Conflict Prevention at the 1990 CSCE Summit. National government agencies, multilateral organizations and civil society organizations have steadily been 'mainstreaming' the concept of conflict prevention into their rhetoric and practice. Diplomatic academies and graduate education in international affairs have begun to emphasize and teach conflict prevention, supplementing the classical approach of analyzing historical crisis management cases.

For the international community—the UN, NATO, the EU and other cooperative international organizations—the past two decades demonstrated that the failure to predict and prevent regional and internal wars called into question the very reason for their existence and the processes by which they make policy. In the most egregious cases, including Rwanda on the eve of the genocide and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of the breakup of FYR, the existing instruments of the international community, including the deployment of armed peacekeepers with humanitarian mandates, high level diplomatic contact groups empowered to craft deals and propose them to the belligerents,

simply did not fit either the timing of those conflicts as they emerged or the sheer scale of human suffering they caused. History would repeat itself in other areas of the world after those failures, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and elsewhere. These very members of the international community began talking in terms of the need to strengthen their capacity for 'early warning' of violent conflict, which—it was hoped—would hopefully awaken the political will of national and international leaders who could then mobilize the diplomatic and military resources to make a difference early on; either to prevent a conflict entirely or to forestall its further escalation.

Conceptual Evolution of Conflict Prevention

The prevention of violent conflict has long been a concern of leaders, states, alliances and international organizations, perhaps as long as some of them have chosen violent conflict as a policy instrument. In recent contemporary history, the prevention of conflict has been upheld as an aspiration of international cooperation. The UN Charter, in its preamble, focused on the prevention of war as one of the principal aims of the UN at its founding. In part due to the stalemate of the Cold War and the assumption that wars, even internal and regional conflicts, were proxies for the US-Soviet rivalry, conflict prevention had not been widely practiced even by the UN, the most important and legitimate international organization dedicated to international peace, security and development.

The UN Charter's Basis for Preventive Action

The UN Charter contains numerous references to conflict prevention practices. For example, Article 34 under Chapter VI "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" provides for the UN Security Council to investigate any "situation which might lead to international

friction." Article 33 authorizes the Security Council to call on any dispute parties to settle their dispute by peaceful means, if its continuance is likely to endanger international peace. Under Chapter VII, "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression," Article 39 emphasizes UNSC action to "maintain or restore" peace. Article 40 gives the UNSC the power to call upon parties to take provisional measures (such as ceasefires, redeployments, etc.) pending resolution of the conflict. Article 43 calls for UN member states to negotiate agreements for the provision of armed forces available to the Security Council. Article 50 discusses rights of consultation for countries facing negative economic impacts due to "preventive or enforcement" measures taken by the UNSC. Article 99 empowers the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that may "threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Despite so many preventive aspects of the Charter, the UN system as a whole and the international community remained firmly entrenched in a culture of reaction.

Moving From Reaction to Prevention

There has also been a growing sense that such conflicts as the violent internal and regional wars of the post Cold War era could have been significantly mitigated or stopped altogether had a culture of prevention prevailed over the entrenched practices of great and medium powers reacting to conflicts, and only in accord with their political interests. It is now possible to compare the actual cost of reactive peace operations and humanitarian interventions with the projected cost of preventive action: For example, an analysis by the Carnegie Commission concluded that $200 billion was actually spent on the 1990s operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia and the Persian

Gulf War while the comparatively smaller budget of $70 billion would have sufficed to implement a preventive strategy in those cases.[4] While such conclusions and arguments involve counterfactual analysis, the possibilities they raise are intriguing to policymakers and theorists concerned with the ever-escalating humanitarian, political and economic costs of violent conflict.

There have been several important conceptual milestones in the development of a more comprehensive and robust international conflict resolution practice that include conflict prevention. During the 1980s, in the twilight years of the Cold War, a number of international interventions such as those in Namibia and Cambodia created new precedents for more holistic, multidisciplinary peace-keeping that combined military forces and humanitarian assistance with an emphasis on governance and post conflict justice and reconciliation. As with numerous past efforts, these operations took place in the aftermath of violence and upon the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement. The mode of intervention was still 'reaction' rather than prevention.

However, the global conflict panorama began to change in disturbing ways. The concept of conflict prevention has gained in strength as the ferocity of internal, regional and interstate wars grew since the end of the Cold War. Not all of the Cold War legacy conflicts resolved themselves as the Cold War passed away. More importantly, a series of shockingly violent internal and interstate wars were ignited and fought, ostensibly around

[4] Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, A/55/985, S/2001/574, June 7, 2001.

issues of ethnic and religious identity, among other non-ideological causes. These conflicts often created massive humanitarian crises and civilians were no longer 'collateral damage' but direct targets. Belligerents—whether state or non-state actors—were often fractious, resistant to negotiation, inclined to break ceasefires, and highly committed to violence. International leadership and global public opinion began to align in favor of more assertive action in response to this situation. This was symbolized nowhere more powerfully than in the unprecedented cooperation within the UN Security Council that began in the early 1990s.

The Security Council Summit and An Agenda for Peace

In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council unanimously authorized a US-led international military coalition to reverse the Iraqi occupation. As the Cold War came to an end, the UN Security Council met as a summit of heads of state or government on January 31, 1992, for the first time in its history. One of the outcomes of the summit was that the Security Council envisioned taking more action for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Council tasked the UN Secretary General to report on ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for "preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping."[5] And they noted that his "analysis and recommendations could cover the role of the United Nations in identifying potential crises and areas of instability…"—a reference to the need for detection and early warning of impending conflicts.[6]

[5] Note by the President of the Security Council, 3046th Meeting of the UNSC, S/23500, January 31, 1992.

[6] Ibid, p. 3

Thus, one of the most critical of the contemporary conceptual milestones was the publication, five months after the Security Council summit, of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.[7] In his report, the Secretary General wrote that the aims of the UN must be:

"To seek to identify at the *earliest possible stage* situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;

- Where conflict erupts, to *engage in peacemaking* aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;

- Through peace-keeping, to work to *preserve peace, however fragile*, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in *implementing agreements* achieved by the peacemakers;

- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

- And in the largest sense, to *address the deepest causes of conflict*: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression…[8]

[7] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the Statement at the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, A/47/277, S/24111, June 17, 1992

[8] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace*, paragraph 15 (emphasis added).

An Agenda set out a multidimensional concept of conflict prevention that encompassed 1) "diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict," 2) the immediate containment of a conflict in its early stages, and 3) the prevention of a recurrence or relapse of a halted conflict. All three were and continue to be valid and interlocking dimensions of international action to prevent conflict although they differ in terms of timing of such action and the instruments and policies to be used at each stage.

In its purest form, conflict prevention entails action that is taken prior to the eventuality of a conflict, yet in practice, conflicts are dynamic and can overwhelm even the best intentioned of preventive practices. Thus the emphasis on early action after the outbreak of violence and prevention of further relapse are necessary adjuncts to the pure definition.

The instruments for doing so were restated by the UNSG, including the use of:

Diplomatic missions by the SG, senior staff or regional organizations. Such preventive diplomacy would make use of, as needed:

- confidence building measures
- fact-finding missions by the principal UN organs
- early warning networks making use of the UN's own specialized agencies on the ground in conflict regions, as well as the knowledge of regional organizations
- preventive military deployments that would either deter an aggressor or reduce tensions among potential internal or interstate conflict parties

- the creation of demilitarized zones, especially on shared borders.[9]

The emphasis in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* continued to be in strict compliance with the requirements of the UN Charter, Art. 2(7) recognizing the domestic jurisdiction of states and proscribing international intervention without state consent. While Chapter 7 of the UN Charter had long before carved out the circumstances under which the domestic jurisdiction provisions of Art. 2(7) no longer applied, the *Agenda* still proceeded with caution.

More assertively, the UNSG also recommended that a long-unfulfilled aspect of the international conflict management system be reinvigorated when he called for the negotiation of agreements under Article 43 of the UN Charter, which was intended to make available both ad hoc and permanently available armed forces to the UN. While it would be the Security Council that would have to authorize such deployments in the case of imminent armed conflict, the UNSG proposed that the units be placed under the command of the Secretary General directly.[10] Such "peace-enforcement" deployments would be highly useful in the true prevention and deterrence of violence, but also to restore a broken ceasefire and prevent a recurrence of more violence. For a variety of reasons including the structural dynamics of the UNSC membership—which reflected the global balance of power in the wake of the Second World War—most states have tended to be cool to several of the concepts of *An Agenda*. This has tended to undermine the

[9] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraphs 23-33.

[10] *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 44.

preventive capacity of the UN as a global collective security organization. Most critically of course, any conflict involving a permanent member of the UNSC or even a close ally would be able to evade any preventive mechanisms of the UN.

An Agenda for Peace also argued for a more innovative concept linked to prevention of conflict recurrence: "post-conflict peace-building," which would entail very comprehensive activities that range from demining, to demobilization, disarming and reintegration, to the support for the creation of democratic governing structures in the post-conflict state.

The Post Cold War Panorama: Failures to Prevent

Naturally, the state of the world did not remain static with the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. States, regional organizations and especially international organizations such as the UN continued to evolve the practice of preventive diplomacy, and the UN Secretary General created the then-new Department of Political Affairs in part to provide early warning of impending conflicts, policy recommendations for UN and international preventive action, as well as analysis of options for action in ongoing conflicts.

The wars, interventions and lessons learned from the conflicts in Angola, Somalia, Haiti and the former Yugoslav republic, particularly the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, among other conflicts, led the Secretary General to further thinking about conflict resolution capacity of the international community. In January

1995, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali issued his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*.[11] Among the problems he noted were the UN's lack of senior diplomatic personnel capable of carrying out preventive diplomatic missions or peace-making missions and the difficulties of financing preventive diplomatic missions.[12] He highlighted the continuing lack of UN access to deployable forces: not a single one of the 19 countries that had troops on standby agreed to deploy them to the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda when the Security Council authorized an expansion of UNAMIR while the genocide was underway in May 1994.[13] Of course, this came in the wake of the traumatic events surrounding the UN/US intervention in Somalia.

As the Rwandan genocide took place in the aftermath of a comprehensive peace process, and in the presence of a UN mission, the case brought into stark relief the frailty of international conflict resolution practice and the continuing human propensity for genocidal violence. In many ways Rwanda was a case of the cumulative failure of conflict prevention: even with early intelligence of impending genocidal violence and an international peacekeeping mission on the ground, a small group of *genocidaire* leaders was able to successfully cow the Security Council into paralysis and worse, denial about what was happening and unwillingness to take action that would have prevented the genocide. The force commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire had warned the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of an impending "extermination" campaign against

[11] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 25, 1995

[12] Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraphs 28-32.

[13] Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 43.

Rwandan Tutsis in his January 11, 1994 cable.[14] As is now widely known, the DPKO rebuffed General Dallaire, utterly ignored his warnings and denied his requests for permission to undertake vigorous action to raid weapons caches that were to be used in the genocide. The magnitude of violence in Rwanda highlights the fact even robust and sustained conflict resolution efforts—intended to prevent the escalation of violence, if not its initial outbreak—can fail utterly if the peacemakers and mediators are uncoordinated and lack the political will to face the unexpected outcomes of their work, and if the conflict parties see more utility in war than in peaceful settlement.

While a full analysis of the international community's failures in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that the international community was indeed engaged in Rwanda *prior to* the genocide. The pre-genocide war in Rwanda had its roots decades before the events of 1994, and started with the October 1990 incursion into Rwanda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces from Uganda. In focusing on the horrors of the genocide, it is often overlooked that almost immediately after the 1990 RPF incursion, formal and informal mediation efforts were initiated by Belgium, Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda, the UN, the OAU, and another regional organization, the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes Region. According to Bruce Jones' exhaustive study of that peace process, "these efforts were not designed specifically to prevent a genocide, but they were designed to prevent an escalation of the conflict and

[14] The cable from General Dallaire entitled "Request for Protection for Informant," to Maj. Gen. Baril, DPKO, January 11, 1994. At http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw011194.pdf

lay the groundwork for peace" (Jones 2001). Ceasefire agreements were signed in March 1991, September 1991 and July 12, 1992, but broke down each time.

The Rwandan government and the RPF finally began comprehensive peace negotiations in June 1992, skillfully facilitated by Tanzania, with participation and support from a wide variety of neighboring states, the US, France, Belgium, Germany, the OAU and the UN. The official mediation efforts were supplemented by Track II diplomacy, including efforts by the Vatican's Papal Nuncio. The peace efforts gained momentum and culminated in the Arusha Accords signed on August 4, 1993. And yet, as skillful as the mediation of the peace process was, and as comprehensive as the Arusha Accords were, neither was successful in stopping the ongoing war between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda. Worse still, the prevention and peace-keeping measures taken as a result of the peace process, including the deployment of the UNAMIR mission, provided early warning of the genocide, only to be effectively ignored by nearly every major international actor. The Rwandan genocide, as well as numerous other cases where there was international engagement, are not "failures of preventive action, but failures to act preventively." (Ackermann 1999: 25). This points us once again to the intentions underlying the actions of international engagement, which would or should determine the ensuing strategies. The Arusha peace process for Rwanda, as comprehensive, well-structured and well-intentioned as it was, resulted in a peace agreement that would not be implemented. It was never structured to prevent the genocide in any way.

The shame of the Rwanda debacle perhaps helps us see why the Secretary General in 1995 went beyond the call to negotiate Article 43 agreements and urged the creation of a UN rapid reaction force always available for the Security Council to call upon in an international emergency. Such a force would have great capacity for conflict prevention in crises where an armed force with a broad mandate was needed to prevent the outbreak, escalation or renewal of armed conflict. As noted above, it bears mentioning that if such a force were available to the Security Council, it would almost certainly be prevented from deploying to a conflict in which a permanent member was either a direct or proxy party. The US 'war of choice' in Iraq and, on a lesser scale, the Russian incursion into Georgia in August 2008 are but two examples of conflicts that a P5 member initiated in defiance of international consensus and outside of the frameworks of international organizations or established defensive alliances. In the Secretary General's *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* he noted that when member states are parties to a conflict—interstate or internal—they raise barriers to the Secretariat's preventive diplomacy activities. "Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and peacemaking activities on Member States who do not want them. Legally and politically, their request for, or at least acquiescence in, United Nations action is a *sine qua non*."[15]

Prevention, as an operational concept, would nevertheless be reaffirmed as a result of the failures of international community regarding Rwanda, notably in the 2004 Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide and the International Commission on Intervention

[15] Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 28.

and State Sovereignty, which identified the responsibility to prevent genocide as the most critical of postures for the international community to adopt.[16]

It must be soberly noted that the international community's retrospective on Rwanda did not preclude failures to prevent further wars in Liberia, chaos and collapse in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Israel-Hezb'allah, Palestine-Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and many other cases (Zartman 2005). And international consensus in favor of ending Sudan's long war with the SPLM/A in Southern Sudan has failed to translate into anything more than frail efforts to end Sudan's war making and genocidal violence in Darfur.

In any case, the failures to prevent and the obstacles to action have in no way diluted the necessity of a global emphasis on conflict prevention—however configured. Instead, they have underlined the ongoing urgency of building international consensus in favor of conflict prevention systems, strategies and actions.

While the UN continues to be a pivotal piece of any global or regional approach to conflict prevention, efforts to realize some of Boutros Ghali's recommendations and to innovate others, have been ongoing. Under Kofi Annan's leadership, the UN made major improvements in its organization and work in order to reduce some of the bureaucratic gridlock and introduce cross departmental, interagency collaboration in the service of

[16] International Peace Academy, *Ten Years After the Genocide in Rwanda: Building Consensus on the Responsibility to Protect*, Report on the Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide, Jointly organized by the governments of Rwanda and Canada, United Nations, New York, March 26, 2004. Accessed at http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/10_YEARS_AFTER_GENOCIDE.pdf

prevention.[17] Annan himself has taken the lead on conflict prevention activities, for example, personally engaging in a successful long-term effort to prevent any outbreak of violence between Nigeria and Cameroon before and after a 2002 ICJ ruling that awarded the Bakassi Peninsula, an oil-rich territory they were disputing, to Cameroon. The UN, for all of its shortcomings, is the premier international organization. It can continue to play an ever more robust and well-considered role in prevention activities of all types (Hampson and Malone 2002).

Preventive Deployment

If all goes well, a preventive diplomacy effort will successfully stop escalatory tendencies and return the parties to the path of constructive, collaborative resolution of their political differences by non-violent means. In numerous cases, preventive diplomacy is undertaken at several levels simultaneously (UN, regional organizations and states) with varying degrees of coordination. However, the peace that is consolidated by diplomacy may need to be preserved by the threat of more coercive measures, and preventive diplomacy can be combined with the preventive deployment of military forces.

There are two cases of preventive action that successfully combined preventive diplomatic action by the UN and other international actors with a Blue-Helmet preventive military deployment. These cases appear to more closely conform to the definition of conflict prevention activities as they were initiated in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities. Two 'true' preventive deployments are MINURCA in the Central African

[17] Report of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, A/55/985 S/2001/574, June 7, 2001.

Republic and UNPREDEP in Macedonia. We limit our discussion in this chapter to MINURCA only, as the remainder of our book addresses the origins of the Macedonia conflict; the initiation, conduct and termination of UNPREDEP; and the causes and consequences of the post-UNPREDEP ethnic conflict that broke out in 2001. In this chapter, it should be noted that UNPREDEP's contribution to peace in Macedonia was painfully confirmed two years after the mission's sudden demise; violence broke out between a shadowy Kosovo-linked militant group and Macedonian government forces. Henryk Sokalski, Polish diplomat and head of UNPREDEP from 1995 to 1998, has argued that the withdrawal of the mission left Macedonia vulnerable to infiltration from Kosovo and that its continued presence would have helped Macedonians avoid the painful ethnic violence of 2001 (Sokalski 2003).

MINURCA and the Central African Republic

After a political crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) erupted and threatened to become a wider armed conflict with potential regional implications (CAR borders Chad, Sudan, Cameroon, Congo and the DRC), an Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB), was established by the Presidents of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in January 1997. All four had helped mediate a ceasefire between the government of the CAR and armed rebel groups, which was followed immediately by a comprehensive settlement of the conflict (The Bangui Agreements). However, the political, military and socio-economic situation continued to be unstable and prone to violence, although outright civil war had not broken out yet. Further ceasefire arrangements were signed in June and July 1997. In August 1997, the President of CAR requested that the UN Security Council put MISAB under its authority, and under Resolutions 1125 and 1136

(1997), the Security Council authorized and extended MISAB's mandate under Ch. VII. Upon the expiration of the Security Council's authorization to MISAB in January 1998, the Secretary General called for MISAB to be replaced with a UN peace operation.[18] The UN created MINURCA (the UN Mission in The Central African Republic) by Resolution 1159 (1998) of March 27, 1998.

MINURCA did not simply deploy armed men with blue helmets in CAR to monitor events passively. The mission was relatively aggressive in deterring and "curbing threats to the country's stability," therefore creating the stable atmosphere needed for the peace process to unfold. The Security Council, by successive Ch. VII resolutions, extended the mandate of MINURCA progressively over the next year, to include what are today widely referred to as peacebuilding tasks, including electoral assistance, demobilization, decommissioning and redeployment, and supporting a political mission to monitor and encourage implementation of the Bangui Accords. The overall framework of this extremely small operation remained consistent: the provision of security to the population and the international personnel and thus the prevention of conflict. MINURCA is credited with creating a climate for constructive political dialogue within CAR. In his subsequent reports, the Secretary General affirmed the numerous preventive actions that MINURCA undertook, including strategic deployments around the country and the capital to deter outbreaks of violence, prevent escalations, disarm belligerents, decommission weapons and generally to provide security to the population while the national army was still being

[18] Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning the Situation in The Central African Republic, S/1998/61, January 23, 1998.

reformed in accordance with the peace agreement.[19] The Secretary General also noted his inclination to inform the CAR government that MINURCA's continued deployment depended on the government's steady progress in implementing the peace accords.[20] MINURCA is a successful case of conflict prevention that relied on a light preventive deployment of UN forces with a broad mandate. Perhaps due to the catastrophic conflicts that surround CAR and the fact the that world's intractable and bloody conflicts attract more intervention and media attention than relatively quiet successes, this case has been largely overlooked by practitioners and theorists alike.

Of note, we can appreciate the initially appropriate regional response to the potential conflict in CAR; its eventual transformation into a more robust UN-authorized mission, the Secretary General's explicit linkage between the UN's willingness to support the mission and the government's willingness to implement its obligations under the peace accords.

Critiques of Conflict Prevention

The concept of conflict prevention and the activities that fall within the domain are not without their critics. Conflict prevention as described by Boutros Ghali has been criticized by some as too inclusive. Indeed in the ambitious terms of *An Agenda*, the concept spans the entire cycle of conflict. Others argue that poorly timed conflict

[19] Third Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1201 (1998) of October 15, 1998. S/ 1998/1203, December 18, 1998

[20] Eventually, MINURCA was replaced with a new kind of mission: The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). See United Nations, "Central African Republic, MINURCA background" accessible at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurcaB.htm

prevention efforts may only delay the onset of the violent phase of a conflict. Once again, a plea for strategy and intentionality is in order.

Stedman (1995: 17-19) argued plainly that some conflicts have to 'get worse before they get better'. In his negative evaluation of Europe's early recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence, he argued that "the urge to take preventive action—to do something, anything—can lead to ill-considered policies that lack strategic sense." He further argues: "the prevention of war in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda would have involved substantial risk and great cost." The constructive aspect of his critique urges prioritization, clear interests and adequate resourcing for preventive efforts so that they do not simply become an opportunity for early failure (Stedman 1995: 20).

Michael Lund, who has written thoughtfully and published widely on conflict prevention, notes that conflict resolution activities undertaken to address underlying causes of conflict—commonly thought to be all too infrequent but necessary in the long term—may in fact miss the acute indicators of impending political violence, especially in internal wars (Lund 1996: 383). Others have noted that transitions to democracy and free trade capitalism, which seek to provide people with better participation in the political and economic system, can actually exacerbate conflict when emergent political parties organize along sectarian lines and view competition for resources and power as a zero sum struggle even as economic reforms cancel out old ways of distributing patronage and basic security (Crawford 1998).

The question of timing, as noted, should neither be overemphasized nor neglected. An expansive conceptualization of conflict prevention that includes every possible conflict management activity at any point in the life cycle of a conflict reduces the concept's validity. Yet there are numerous points in a conflict during which preventive activities can have the desired effect. Ripeness theory's adherents have correctly argued that both a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) help create ripe moments for conflict de-escalation (Touval and Zartman 2001). Creative preventive diplomacy can heighten perceptions of the MHS and propose the MEO at any time in a conflict. It is true that timing and structuring mediation poorly may lead to temporarily worse conflict outcomes, as the EU/OSCE mediation conducted by France, Finland and the US in the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008 demonstrated. At the same time, mediation that takes place after significant loss of life, or after a conflict has endured and demonstrated its 'intractability' is believed to be less successful than efforts taken prior to massive violence. Preventive diplomacy—in the form of international conflict mediation before any significant loss of life—appears to be seriously underutilized (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007; Lund 1996: 384).

Lund defines prevention as "[p]reemptive timing of actions at previolent stages of particular incipient conflicts," and notes that it need not be limited to mediation, but which might also comprise other conflict resolution activities. These could include but not be limited to arbitration, problem-solving workshops, economic and development assistance, mass media and information campaigns in favor of peace, among others (Lund 1996: 384-385). Such instruments can be used simultaneously. Lund notes that among the

conditions for success for such efforts is the absence of parties attempting to undermine the prevention efforts by provision of military assistance.

Zartman (2007: 19), among the most eminent of scholars of international conflict and its resolution, lauds conflict prevention, while also noting insightfully that it poses a dilemma for analysts and practitioners: "…But how can the attentions of public and government be mobilized when a potential crisis is still cold? And how can one distinguish a conflict that will become a crisis, and therefore needs prevention from one that will burn out on its own and blow away without causing damage?"

Zartman poses these questions as the introduction to a later chapter by Herbert Kelman (2007), who examines several social-psychological processes that help explain the pervasiveness and duration of conflict. Also noted are the streams of research that call attention to human beings' collective tendency to distort decision-making by excessive and inappropriate selectivity in information seeking, and information processing.

The resistance to change, in this case to taking early preventive action before a conflict results in violence and killing, is up against more than bureaucratic stagnation or difficulties of mobilizing collective action. We are also 'wired' to resist doing anything differently. This is troubling because it signifies that early warning systems, intelligence gathering, and conflict analysis may still fail to persuade decision makers and publics that preventive action—whether in the form of diplomacy, security or a combination of both—must be undertaken quickly.

Conflict prevention has grown tremendously in the past two decades as a field of inquiry and a field of practice. This growth has generated healthy debates on the proper analysis of conflict stages, and the appropriate prevention mechanisms that can be implemented in or across the conflict stages. The conceptual evolution has spurred states and international actors such as the UN to reorganize their diplomatic processes internally and coordinate their preventive mechanisms with each other. Cases in which preventive action failed to materialize have motivated the international community to engage in an exchange regarding the need for a culture of action and prevention in contrast with a culture of reaction. Clearly, the international community has a long way to go in terms of mobilizing political will, gathering and analyzing data about conflict, and establishing new norms to guide preventive action. We have begun to learn from failures and to anticipate successes. Prevention, for all the ambiguity and complexity surrounding its actual uses, continues to appeal to all who want humanity to avoid the scourge of war and employ creative and less coercive ways of addressing conflict.

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CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT IN MACEDONIA

Anton GRIZOLD*

This book discusses the genesis and evolution of the violent internal ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001. Up until 2001, a whole decade after the demise of Yugoslavia, Macedonia was considered a model for the relatively harmonious coexistence of two ethnic communities, Macedonian and Albanian. Likewise, Macedonia was considered the only country to have gained its independence from the former Yugoslavia without armed conflict. This chapter analyzes the circumstances that led to ethnic tension transforming into armed conflict between the Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents in 2001. The analysis also discusses how the conflict was resolved and the post-conflict approach to the problem in the context of the emerging international security environment that the new state of Macedonia found itself in.

Introduction

Despite the fact that the use of force is regulated by international law and international organizations, the history of international relations, including in Europe, is characterised by armed conflict.[21] The Cold War did not escalate into armed conflict between the two

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[21] War as an instrument of national policy was first renounced by the Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928; the treaty was only binding for the signatories. The United Nations Charter broadened and legitimised the interdiction of war, with two exceptions: a) the Charter provides for the right to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (Article 51), and b) such measures (including armed conflict) may be authorised by the Security Council in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 43).

protagonists, the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States of America (USA); however, the two superpowers did become involved in a series of proxy wars in third countries. In addition to international conflicts during the Cold War, there were also internal conflicts within individual countries which, due to the (relatively) untouchable concept of national sovereignty of the time, did not draw much attention. At a time when the international community was far more state-centred than it is today, these national conflicts were neither discussed at length, nor was much attention paid to them during the Cold War period.

At the end of the Cold War, the international environment changed significantly and the security paradigm (provocation, problems, security threats, responses, processes and institutions) began to assume new important characteristics (Grizold, 2005: 7). The main threat in the new international environment was no longer the danger of armed conflict between antagonist countries, rather, internal conflict became far more important and a greater threat to international peace. Nicholson (1996: 14), for example, points out that "non-state wars" are the main type of (modern) political violence. A similar opinion has been voiced by Holsti (1996: 14), who points out that in most of the wars of the 20th century, one community within a country rejected the rule of another community within the same country, categorizing such wars as internal rather than international conflicts.[22] These so-called "new wars" can be partially explained within the context of globalisation: greater interdependency in the world means that in recent decades ideological and/or

[22] There were a total of 167 wars between 1945 and 1995; 77% of these were internal rather than international. According to this methodology, war is defined as a conflict that causes at least 1000 casualties per year (Holsti, 1996: 14).

territorial divides have been enhanced by the political divide between cosmopolitanism (based on inclusive, multicultural values) and the policies of particular identities. The rift between those that are part of global processes and those that are excluded from the same fans wars which result in eviction, forced migration and mass murders, as well as different types of political, psychological and economic pressure (Kaldor in Baylis, Smith, 2001: 269).

Other explanations also shed light on the phenomenon of the massively violent internal wars of the post Cold War era. Crawford (1998), for example, argues that in the context of the emergence of weak democratic institutions, coupled with economic liberalization, old social contracts fall away and political activity is more easily mobilized on the basis of identity groups that then seek distribution of resources exclusively toward their own, rather to any cross-cutting national identity. The weak democratic institutions cannot repress violence or separatism the way prior authoritarian forms did, but neither do they provide for equality of political opportunity in the quest to access the resources of the state. Identity politics exceed the bounds of advocacy and take on an aura of real or perceived grievance and non-negotiable stances on basic political issues, setting the stage for violence instead of 'normal politics'.

The Cold War maxim of non-interference in internal affairs meant that jurisdiction over internal conflicts was solely in the hands of the state itself, but when the Cold War ended, the barriers that prevented the assertion of the concept of indivisible security and the (co-) responsibility of all international players for world peace were brought down.

The concept of conflict prevention and resolution during the Cold War was inseparable from the principles governing international relations at the time, that were defined, at the most basic level, by national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations (1953-1961), applied a "horizontal approach" to conflict prevention and preventive action, the principle of which was preventing violence from spreading beyond national borders.[23] After the end of the Cold War, a "vertical approach" was applied to the concept of conflict prevention and resolution to complement and deepen the "horizontal approach", whereby the international community began taking interest in conflicts before they spread beyond national borders (to other countries), i.e. while a conflict is still an "internal matter". The basic difference between the two concepts is in their approach towards national sovereignty – whereas the "horizontal approach" does not, in principle, concern itself with matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the country in question, the "vertical approach" does.

Modern conflicts, both violent and non-violent, have transformational consequences that change the goals and values of the participants, their mutual relations and, consequently, the social structures they inhabit at the micro and macro level. Despite a plethora of literature on, and practices of conflict resolution, we find that most conflicts have not been permanently resolved. Conflict management is far more likely as both process and

[23] In his Annual Report on the Work of the Organization 1959–60, Hammarskjöld wrote that preventive action must in the first place fill the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties (Väyrynen 2003: 47).

outcome, where internal dynamics or external intervention (or both) alter the nature of the conflict and its agenda by making it less destructive.

In the Western Balkans,[24] threats within the changed security environment manifested themselves in a particularly violent manner. This chapter will not discuss the entire Western Balkan region but will be limited to Macedonia – a country that had been considered an "oasis of peace" from the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) through to 2001, due to the fact the conflict – which did indeed exist and even escalated – remained at a latent phase until that time. We shall discuss whether the situation in Macedonia was merely a matter of conflict transformation into a manageable (latent) phase, or whether the root causes of the conflict were in actual fact eliminated. The security situation of any country depends on internal and external factors; the chapter therefore analyzes the internal factors that arise primarily (but not exclusively) from contradictions between the Macedonian Albanian populations, while the analysis of external factors focuses primarily on the difficult relations between Macedonia and her neighbours and the effect of certain events in her immediate vicinity on her security and stability. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to analyze the armed conflict[25] in Macedonia in order to find an answer to the question as to why ethnic Albanian insurgents took up arms in 2001 as a means of achieving their goals.

[24] The region of the Western Balkans includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and, in accordance with Resolution no. 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations, Kosovo as well (European Commission, 2008: 2).

[25] In literature discussing the Macedonian political crisis and the eruption of violence in 2001, the expressions "armed conflict" or simply "conflict" are used more commonly than "war" or "ethnic conflict".

Macedonia in the (new) international security environment

For Macedonia and the broader Western Balkans region, according to some sources, Kosovo's declaration of independence and the creation of the new state on 17 February 2008 signified the final step in the disintegration of the SFRY, and a new chapter for this region and the international community. This final phase in the political history of the SFRY confirms a theory proposed by Adam Michnik that nationalism is the final stage of communism. With the realisation of the political, ideological and historical goal of the Kosovo Albanians, the question of what influence the creation of the newly-formed country would have on the security and political situation in Macedonia and the immediate vicinity with its ethnic Albanian populations (southern Serbia, Montenegro, Greece) re-emerged in Macedonia, which borders Kosovo. The question is whether Michnik's claim will be confirmed in the case of Macedonia, which has a significant Albanian minority. The notion that an independent Kosovo is not the final goal of ethnic Albanians (or the final act of the Yugoslav crisis), that they ultimately strive to unite all territories occupied by ethnic Albanians (i.e. a move towards a so-called Greater Albania[26]), is a popular one, particularly in countries that have shown restraint or opposition towards the independence of Kosovo.

This issue has been particularly topical in Macedonia in recent years because of the Albanian minority. Even though Macedonia is still considered an "oasis of peace" vis-à-

[26] The concept of a Greater Albania aims at the unification of Albania with Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia, southern Serbia, and Greece with a presence of Albanian populations. Less expansionist, but no less audacious, is the concept of Greater Kosovo, which aims at the unification of (independent) Kosovo with territories in southern Serbia and western Macedonia with a majority Albanian population. However, in a survey conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006: 16), the concept of a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo is not very popular among Kosovo Albanians – in 2006, only 2.5% supported the idea of unification with Albania while 96% supported the idea of an independent Kosovo.

vis the former Yugoslavia despite the eruption of violence in the first half of 2001, the root cause of conflict between the two ethnic groups has not nearly been removed. This was most recently seen in March and April 2008, when the Macedonian government suffered a major political crisis, which was only resolved after early parliamentary elections were called. The explanation offered by the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) for leaving the ruling coalition was, primarily, the supposed failure to respect ethnic minority rights, which has been a common complaint by Albanian parties against the state. And additional hindrance to the stability of the country and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic "security community"[27] is the fact that the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 did not invite Macedonia to join the organisation, which could have a negative effect on efforts to stabilize political conditions and post-conflict resolution of open issues within the context of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.[28]

Macedonia's position in the Western Balkans is characterised by difficult relations with its neighbours. Relations with Greece have been tense since Macedonia declared its independence, and continue to be so up to 2008 when Macedonia's application for NATO membership was rejected because of Greek demands. Greece has consistently rejected Macedonia's use of the name Macedonia, on the basis of the argument that the name

[27] A security community, according to Karl Deutsch, is a community whose members no longer resort to physical violence for the resolution of common disputes; a security community evolves from a state of common interest, is strengthened by increasing mutual transactions, and results in the process of mutual responsiveness (Deutsch, 1978).

[28] The officiall reason why Macedonia was not invited to join the NATO alliance was the unresolved dispute with Greece regarding the use of the name Macedonia. Greece maintains that the name implies expansionist territorial ambitions in northern Greece, which Macedonia has consistently denied. After Macedonian representatives left the NATO summit prematurely, the Macedonian foreign minister, Antonio Milošoski warned that the rejection of Macedonia could reignite the conflicts in the Balkans (Tuhina, 2008).

implies expansionist tendencies since Macedonia is also the name of Greece's northern province, which Macedonia allegedly wishes to annex. Under pressure from Greece, Macedonia enacted two amendments to its constitution: Amendment I states that the Republic of Macedonia rejects any and all territorial pretension against any neighbouring country while Amendment II states that Macedonia, which is constitutionally bound to assist its kinsmen in other countries, will not interfere with the internal affairs or rights of sovereign countries (Grizold et al, 2007).

Greece first closed its borders with Macedonia and imposed sanctions for several months in August 1992, then again in 1994 for one and a half years (the embargo ended in 1995, when Greece recognised Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The economic sanctions imposed by Greece, as well as the international embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), had a devastating effect on the Macedonian economy, which saw its GDP fall by two-thirds in comparison to its pre-independence level (Greco, 1999).[29]

Relations with Macedonia's eastern neighbour, Bulgaria, are no better, even though Bulgaria was the first country to recognise Macedonia's independence. Bulgaria rejects the notion that the Macedonians are an ethnically distinct nationality and that Macedonian is a distinct language. Bulgaria's rejection of the above is based on two main arguments: a) the denial of the existence of a Macedonian ethnic community in Bulgaria,

[29] Macedonia's GDP was USD 3.82 billion in 1991, USD 1.9 billion in 1993, USD 1.5 billion in 1994, USD 1.3 billion in 1996 and in 1997, and USD 3.4 billion in 1999 (Stermec, 2004: 29).

and b) territorial claims against Macedonia on the basis of claims that the population of Macedonia is Bulgarian rather than Macedonian (Tatalović, 1999: 1048).

The Macedonian political system suffers from a lack of transparency and corruption is endemic, particularly among the country's political elite. Corruption has acquired the capacity not only to retard economic progress but also to feed organised crime. It should be noted that both ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political parties, i.e. the very parties that frequently confront each other in public, are both involved in profiteering (International Crisis Group, 2002). One of the most high-profile scandals of recent years, which has been highly damaging to Macedonia's international reputation and stability, is the so-called "sugar scandal".[30] It was, however, not the only scandal to shake the country's reputation.[31]

Organised crime, which coexists with corruption, has had an adverse effect on the security situation in the country. Macedonia, which lies at the heart of the Balkan peninsula, serves as a transit point for illicit drugs, human trafficking, smuggling in

[30] The "sugar scandal" involved the sale of Macedonia's only sugar refinery in Bitola. This led to a sugar shortage, which had an adverse effect on the food and non-alcoholic beverages industries. The government intervened by allowing limited quantities of duty-free sugar to be imported, however, the contracts were awarded to companies closely associated with the VMRO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party of Albanians; this allowed certain individuals within these parties to earn large sums of money illegally (International Crisis Group, 2001: 13).

[31] Corruption infected the customs service, where the director Dragan Daravelski indirectly coerced businesses to contract transportation companies in which he had significant interests to move their goods across the border. Using other transportation companies usually meant trouble. Another corruption scandal involved the management of assets belonging to the national health fund (the director of the institution was Vojo Mihajlovski, the General Secretary of the then ruling party VMRO-DPMNE) – suppliers of medical devices were required to pay a kickback of 5% of the value of the equipment. This figure gradually rose to 30%. There are several other examples of corruption involving individuals from the highest levels of government.

weapons, cigarettes, and petrol. During the trade embargo against the FRY in the 1990s, large quantities of contraband passed through Macedonia and even reputable Macedonian companies got involved in illegal trafficking.[32]

Smuggling, which was tolerated by the country's institutional framework, became common in the years following the outbreak of hostilities. Because of corruption, goods were smuggled across official border crossing points, from which many officials (both Macedonian and Albania) made handsome profits (International Crisis Group, 2001: 13).

Genesis of the conflict leading to the outbreak of hostilities (2001)

> "There is near-universal agreement that prevention is preferable to cure, and that strategies of prevention must address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent symptoms."
>
> (Annan, 2000: 44).

Ethnic conflict in Macedonia did not begin with the country's independence. Its roots reach far into history and it is in this light that that we should understand the words of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the conflict between the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic communities, which is, as with most contemporary internal conflicts, of a structural nature.[33]

[32] Macedonian Prime Minister Georgievski declared that 27 Macedonian companies dealing in tobacco, alcohol, petroleum, steel and chemicals had close relations with the Milošević regime and that they were also involved in money laundering. Georgievski also admitted that Serbian citizens opened accounts at Macedonian banks which they used to transact with third countries (International Crisis Group, 2001: 12).

[33] The conflict existed before the disintegration of the SFRY, however, it was perceived primarily as a struggle by Albanians for their national rights in a broader sense, namely, within the framework of the SFRY rather than being limited to Macedonia; Albanians living in the SFRY were divided by internal

The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia declared independence on September 17, 1991 following a referendum on independence held on September 8 of the same year. Independence was supported by 95.32% of the votes casted but its legitimacy was undermined by the fact that the referendum was boycotted by the majority of ethnic Albanian voters. A new legal and political order was enacted with the adoption of the Constitution on November 17, 1991.[34] An early development in independent Macedonia was the constitutional act of January 1992, which declared that Macedonia would no longer cooperate with Yugoslav federal institutions and authorities, and which abolished the mandate of all federal representatives in Macedonia. Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations on April 8, 1993 as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and soon became a member of other international organisations as well (Danforth, 1995: 98, 145).[35]

With the disintegration of the SFRY and the creation of new states, the ethnic Albanian population, which had lived in the SFRY up until the early 1990s, found itself in the new political reality that was taking shape on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. New international borders meant that ethnic Albanians from the SFRY now lived in two

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borders – these did not hinder movement nor Albanian political activity. An important reason why the conflict did not erupt earlier lies in the policies of Tito's Yugoslavia, which, as a rule, oppressed nationalist tendencies through the use of force.

[34] Macedonia's path to independence officially began on January 25, 1991, when the Assembly of the then Socialist Republic of Macedonia adopted the Declaration on the Sovereignty and Independence of the State of Macedonia. The Declaration explicitly stated that independence was simply a matter of time.

[35] Macedonia became a full participating member of the OSCE in October 1993; in November 1995 it was admitted to the Council of Europe; on 15 November 1995 it was admitted to the Partnership for Peace; in 1997 it became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; on 29 April 1997 it signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union.

separate countries: a) within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the province of Kosovo, parts of southern Serbia (Preševo, Medveđa and, Bujanovac) and eastern Montenegro, and[36] b) in western Macedonia.[37]

Throughout modern history, there has always been an ethnic Albanian population in Macedonia, which has a population of slightly more than two million. The relative number of the ethnic Albanians has been increasing since the first census in 1948, with the exception of the census of 1953, when they accounted for 12.5% of the population.[38] From the next census in 1961 and up to the most recent one in 2002, the ethnic Albanian population has been constantly increasing. At the last census, 25.17% of the population (509,083 individuals) declared themselves ethnically Albanian, while 64.17% (1,297,981 individuals) declared themselves ethnically Macedonian. It should be noted that the percentage of Macedonians has been falling consistently since the census of 1961 (Grizold et al, 2007).[39]

[36] Following Montenegro's declaration of independence on June 3, 2006, the Albanians found themselves in another new country, Montenegro. Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 had the same impact in this regard.

[37] Until the dissolution of the SFRY and the rise of Milošević's nationalist regime, Albanians living in Macedonia had close contacts with Priština, the administrative centre of Kosovo. The city was, inter alia, the centre of university education in the Albanian language, and after the dissolution of the SFRY, those Albanians that did not live in Kosovo were cut off from Priština. The question of higher education in the Albanian language later proved to be one of the most problematic areas in the relations between the Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community.

[38] The main reason for the drop in the Albanian population was that Turks, Macedonian Muslims and the Roma, who had been considered as Albanians in the 1948 census, were registered as Turks in the new census.

[39] Another important fact is that many Albanians, who were separated after the dissolution of the SFRY, live in areas bordering Macedonia (Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece).

Because of the fragile peace in Macedonia's neighbourhood following the dissolution of the SFRY (Serbia, particularly Kosovo, Albania and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina), UN troops were sent to Macedonia as a preventive measure – the UNPROFOR mission (United Nations Protection Force), which in 1995 became the UNPREDEP mission (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force). The mission's mandate was threefold: 1) to monitor any developments in the border areas between Serbia and Albania which could threaten the territory of Macedonia; 2) by its presence, to deter any developments which could pose a threat to the security of the country; 3) to ensure peace and stability through good practice and governance methods with Macedonian authorities. In addition to the preventive presence, good practices and confidence building, early-warning systems, supervision, reporting and specific social projects, the mission was also tasked with analysing developments that could destabilise the country or lead to a new crisis. It was in the interests of UNDPREDEP to see the implementation of institutional reforms, enhancing the police and judicial system, strengthening the observance of human rights, reforming the electoral system, and promoting the social and economic development of Macedonia. As such, UNDPREDEP was a very broad mission of preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment with a multifunctional strategy in which preventive action was holistically planned and implemented.

As a result of events in Macedonia and the Western Balkans, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted resolution 1110, which resulted in a phased reduction of the military component by 300 troops to a total of 750, and the number of international observers from 19 to 8. In the same year, the Security Council extended the mandate of

UNDPREDEP until August 31, 1998, after which date it anticipated the withdrawal of the military component. Because of increased tensions in the region (events in Albania, the slow and difficult implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, problems in Kosovo, and the failure to determine the border between Macedonia and the FRY), the decision was later changed and the mandate of the military component was extended (Grizold et al, 2007).[40] The UNDPREDEP mission can be assessed as a successful paradigm of preventive peace keeping and an important achievement by the international community.[41] Had events developed and the international community acted differently, the scenario common to this restless region may very well have been repeated: ethnic cleansing, refugees, massacres and wanton destruction. Nevertheless, UNPREDEP was not a panacea for the most fundamental problems afflicting the Macedonian society.

The UNPREDEP mission ended in 1999 and was replaced by NATO troops.[42] This was a difficult year for Macedonia as it accepted almost 300,000 refugees fleeing from Serbian persecution in Kosovo and threatening the stability of the country. This swelled the

[40] In July 1998, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1186 increasing the number of troops on the mission to 1050.

[41] Alice Ackermann (in Väyrynen, 2003: 66) assigns a particularly constructive role in conflict management in Macedonia to UNDPREDEP. An opinion poll conducted in 1997 showed that the majority of Macedonians viewed the role of the mission as positive even though a large number of those polled did not have a particular opinion (Georgieva in Väyrynen, 2003: 66). Jentleson (2003: 39) believes that one of the main reasons for the success of the UNDPREDEP mission lies in the fact that the mission was credible, namely, the force was sufficiently strong and well armed and trained.

[42] The mandate of UNPREDEP ended in 1999, when the Security Council did not renew the mandate as a result of the veto of China. The reason for this was Macedonia's recognition of Taiwan, which caused a harsh reaction from mainland China. According to some interpretations, Macedonia recognised Taiwan in order to ensure that the UNPREDEP mandate was not renewed because it hoped to gain the protection of NATO, which later happened; others view the recognition of Taiwan as a very short-sighted political decision as a result of manipulation of a group of influential people. Taiwan responded to the recognition with a “reward” of USD 1.8 billion, much of which was misappropriated by certain individuals.

number of people in Macedonia by 14.77% and enhanced the sense among the Macedonian ethnic community that their identity was being threatened in their own country.[43] The demographic, social, and economic structure also changed, and the country was transformed from an "oasis of peace" to a "*place d'armee*". After the NATO attack on the FRY in the spring of 1999 and the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution, a majority of the Kosovo refugees returned to their homes. The Kosovo crisis resulted in the re-emergence of the question of ethnic identity in an already fragile and non-cohesive society: Macedonian Albanians accused ethnic Macedonians of lacking sympathy for their brothers from Kosovo, while the Macedonians saw in the refugees potential combatants for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).[44] At the same time, the Macedonian police conducted several raids in northern Macedonia in villages predominantly occupied by ethnic Albanians, and seized large quantities of arms and ammunition.[45] There were reasonable grounds to believe that northern Macedonia served as a base and recruitment centre for KLA combatants, who were fighting the army of the FRY in Kosovo.

The new Macedonian constitution did not define the ethnic Albanian minority as a constitutive nationality, which meant that the rights of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia

[43] Some authors, such as Žagar (in Gabrič, 2006), claim that the refugee crisis had a positive effect on inter-ethnic relations because Macedonia offered refuge to Albanians fleeing from Kosovo, which strengthened the identification of Macedonian Albanians with the state of Macedonia.

[44] The question of identity and its protection by the state became particularly relevant after the end of the Cold War, when the number of internal conflicts based on the issue of ethnic identity increased significantly. The concept of societal security as developed by the Copenhagen school, which is inherently related to the issue of identity, is defined as one of the elements comprising the general concept of security. See: Buzan et al (1998)

[45] The confiscation of weapons in areas predominantly occupied by ethnic Albanians continued even after the outbreak of hostilities in 2001 (South East European Times, 2006).

were *de jure* lesser than those guaranteed to them by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974.[46] The dissatisfaction of the ethnic Albanian community was fanned by the fact that they were denied certain minority rights, such as the right to higher education in their native language.[47] In the SFRY, the Macedonian and Albanian communities developed an elementary level of (peaceful) coexistence, however, their relationship never went beyond avoiding conflict and segregation. In 1992, the Macedonian Albanians held a referendum in which a large majority supported the territorial autonomy of areas occupied by ethnic Albanians.[48] The pro-Albanian protests that followed indicated the tendencies of the Albanian community to actively realise their minority rights (Grizold et al, 2007, Stermec, 2004: 27).[49]

Some Macedonian Albanians were dissatisfied with the level of their representation in government; they claimed that their representation was symbolical – at least until the

[46] Adamson and Jović (2004: 293–311) examined the re-articulation of the post-Yugoslav political identity in Macedonia and found that the ethnic Macedonians transformed themselves from the 'constitutive nationality' to 'majority', whereas the ethnic Albanians found it more difficult to accept the status of 'minority', which was once in Yugoslav Marxist narrative considered to be politically incorrect. They insisted on being recognised as a 'nation', equal to ethnic Macedonians.

[47] According to Petroska-Beska and Najcevska (2004), one of the main reasons why the cooperation at the political level between the two ethnicities in Macedonia has not been extended to the social level is the faulty education system which, rather than promoting reconciliation, reproduces traditional patterns of segregation.

[48] More than 90% of the voters at the referendum supported autonomy. Several municipalities in western Macedonia went as far as declaring autonomy, e.g. the so-called Republika Vevčani and the Albanian Autonomous Republic of Ilirida, which declared autonomy in April 1992.

[49] The protests were directed against a ban on the use of the Albanian language in schools of higher education and a ban on the use of Albanian national symbols. The demonstration eventually transformed into violent clashes between ethnic Albanian protesters and the Macedonian police, e.g. in Tetovo in 1995, when the Macedonian authorities attempted to close the so-called University of Tetovo, where classes were taught in Albanian. In 1996, pro-Albanian protesters demanded the legalisation of the university and its integration into the Macedonian education system. There were several clashes and arrests in 1997 over the displaying of the Albanian flag; legislation was passed in May of the same year allowing ethnic minorities to use symbols of their own choosing.

general elections of 1998, when the victorious VMRO–DPMNE party entered into a coalition with the DPA. The common goal of all ethnic Albanian political parties was to improve the political and cultural rights of the ethnic Albanians. In reality however, the implementation of the rights was viewed by many as being unsatisfactory and too slow. It is this very discontent that served as the basis for the mobilization of ethnic Albanians in February 2001 and the armed insurgency against Macedonian authorities.

Outbreak of hostilities and armed conflict

The conflict escalated in January 2001 with an attack on a police vehicle in the village of Tanuševci, in the immediate vicinity of the border with Kosovo. One police officer was killed and three were injured. Tension had been growing over a number of years before the Tanuševci incident.[50] The attack was strongly condemned by the leader of the DPA, Arben Xhaferi, who described it as an act of violence against the Macedonian authorities and detrimental to the interest of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Responsibility for the attack was assumed by the National Liberation Army (NLA), which sent a letter to the Macedonian newspaper *Dnevnik* explaining that the attack was limited in extent and directed at Macedonian invaders and their Albanian collaborators.[51] The message from the hitherto unknown group caused alarm among the Macedonian public and the

[50] At the outbreak of the conflict, Tanuševci had a population of between 350 and 700, mostly ethnic Albanian. The village lies in the vicinity of the Preševa valley, which served as a training ground for ethnic Albanian insurgents fighting in Kosovo. The local ethnic Albanian population considers the border to be an artificial creation which divided them and intruded on their way of life. Tensions between the Macedonian and Albanian communities had been escalating in the months leading to the events in Tanuševci; in April 2000, four Macedonian soldiers were kidnapped in the vicinity of the village. In return for their release, the kidnappers demanded that the Macedonian authorities release Xhavit Hasani, a controversial personality who was being held in prison for the attempted murder of Macedonian government officials. According to some reports, Hasani was a former commander of the KLA. In 2000, the area witnessed several shooting incidents between Macedonian security forces and smugglers (International Crisis Group, 2001: 1–3).

[51] The full text of the report is available from the International Crisis Group (2001: 3).

information being disseminated by the NLA was contradictory.[52] Another important incident took place in February of the same year, when a television crew from the independent television station A1 was taken by ethnic Albanian gunmen in Tanuševci, and several shooting incidents between Macedonian security forces and armed insurgents were reported in the vicinity of the village in the same month; several members of the Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents were killed (International Crisis Group, 2001: 3–5).

The arrival of Macedonian Army special forces in Tanuševci prompted military action by ethnic Albanian insurgents, including former KLA fighters, primarily to defend ethnic Albanian villages. The violence spread from Tanuševci to Tetovo, the second largest city in Macedonia, which is considered the unofficial capital and political and cultural centre of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. It emerged that ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia had little influence and even less control over the armed insurgents. The party leaders were aware of the growing threat and realised that the insurgents could take matters into their own hands.[53]

After the insurgents rejected an offer to lay down their arms and leave the country, the Macedonian government authorised a military offensive, which began on March 25,

[52] Dosta Dimovska, the Minister for Internal Affairs, denied having any information about the NLA while the former Macedonian intelligence chief Aleksa Stamenkovski claimed that his agency had been in possession of information about the organisation for more than a year (International Crisis Group, 2001: 3).

[53] More on this in the interview between representatives of the International Crisis Group and the leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians Arben Xhaferi and the leader of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) Imer Imeri (International Crisis Group, 2001: 7).

2001. The Macedonian security forces made rapid progress against the insurgents who, according to Macedonian government sources, did not put up much resistance. The next day, the Macedonian government reported that their security forces had flushed the insurgents from the villages surrounding Tetovo. On March 29, the military command of the Macedonian armed forces declared the operation a success and that all the "terrorists", (as the insurgents were branded) were fleeing across the Kosovo border. The commanders of the insurgents announced that they were merely withdrawing in order to regroup (Jane's Information Group in International Crisis Group, 2001: 7–8).

At the outbreak of hostilities, it was estimated that there were only a few hundred ethnic Albanian rebels, however, when the Ohrid Agreement was signed in August of the same year, it emerged that the NLA had over 1,200 fighters and according to some estimates as many as 2,000. At the height of the crisis, the NLA was in control of one-fifth of Macedonian territory (International Crisis Group, 2001: 1).

The rapid constitution of the NLA was abetted by the distinct lines of separation between the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian communities. This meant that there were only few ethnic Macedonians in areas where the NLA was being constituted and their presence did not hinder the mobilization of the rebels.[54] The porous border between Macedonia on the one side and Kosovo and Serbia on the other meant that ethnic Albanian rebels could cross the border with relative ease. Ethnic Albanian rebels from the Liberation Army of

[54] In general, political mobilization in Macedonia on the basis of ethnic premises, and consequently "ethnification", is problematic in itself as it renders the country's political system deficient and potentially unstable (Vankovska, 2003: 233).

Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UCPMB) who trained in southern Serbia, and the remnants of the (disbanded) KLA joined the forces of the NLA. According to its leaders, the NLA was seeking to institute political reforms in Macedonia, which was also the goal of the ethnic Albanian political parties. The NLA made several contradictory statements, causing much alarm in Macedonia and the international community. For example, in February 2001, the NLA stated that its primary goal was the creation of an Albanian state in the Balkans, while only a few days later, they claimed to be seeking to improve the rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The NLA later constantly rejected charges that their ultimate goal was the federalisation of Macedonia with the aim of partitioning Macedonia and, eventually, realising the idea of Greater Kosovo (or Greater Albania).[55]

Two of the main casus belli for the conflict, which escalated into armed struggle, are the disproportionately low representation of ethnic Albanians vis-à-vis the ethnic Macedonians in state institutions, and the barriers to obtaining Macedonian citizenship erected by the government.[56] The secessionist aspirations of a section of the ethnic Albanians also contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Further, a very important reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the determination with which the government

[55] The assertion that the NLA changed its declared objectives as a result of unambiguous and decisive moves by the international community is not unfounded; when the international community expressed its unconditional support for the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state and energetically opposed federalisation, the NLA, which lacked superiority, toned-down its ambitions. Gabrič (2006: 146) states that similar statements were made by Arben Xhaferi, leader of the largest ethnic Albanian party of the time (Democratic Party of Albanians) and then Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski.

[56] International Crisis Group (2001: 10) claims that between 110 and 117 thousand ethnic Albanians in Macedonia did not have citizenship, ten times greater than the figures provided by the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior (11,151). The requirements for acquiring citizenship were as follows: 15 years resident in Macedonia, proof of income and fluency in Macedonian.

tackled criminal groups smuggling contraband between Macedonia and Kosovo.[57] Some authors (e.g. Gounev, 2003) believe that it is futile to expect a reduction in organised crime until the poorest classes of Macedonians are provided with a suitable economic alternative. Despite the broad reasons given above, the mobilization resulted in a disorderly situation for the ethnic Albanian minority at the outbreak of the conflict. Although we might accept the hypothesis that ethnic Albanians on both sides of the Macedonian-Kosovo border took up arms because of economic interests, the conflict became a broader internal conflict because of the reasons mentioned above, the common denominator being the issue of identity and the status of the ethnic Albanian community in the state of Macedonia.

Because of their exclusion from the political institutions of the Macedonian state, ethnic Albanians had been staging different types of protests from the very independence of Macedonia. The failure by ethnic Albanian political parties (or the uncompromising position of the ethnic Macedonian side) to implement political, economic, and cultural reforms, resulted in armed insurgency. Although the Macedonian government began eliminating deficiencies and implementing reforms regarding the use of the Albanian language in state institutions, the ethnic composition of the police, the establishment of Albanian-language universities and administrative decentralisation, the insurgency broke

[57] According to the Macedonian government, the main reasons for the outbreak of the conflict were in Kosovo, where the insurgents planned the rebellion against Macedonian authorities. The Macedonian government offered the explanation that the insurgents were from Kosovo and lacked the support of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. This is a questionable statement as many of the insurgents claimed to be from Macedonia (International Crisis Group, 2001: 9). In an interview with Melita Gabrič (2006: 143) in 2003, i.e. two years after the conflict, Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski said that he believed that the insurgency began for reasons related to crime.

out before the reforms were enacted. Reforms require a certain amount of time before they achieve their full effect, more so in less-developed countries, and sections of the ethnic Albanian population were evidently dissatisfied with the pace at which their status was improving (Gabrič, 2006).

Although the ethnic Albanian insurgents claimed that their goal was to improve the status of the ethnic Albanians and not the federalisation of the country, a large number of ethnic Macedonians were afraid that their true goal was the partitioning of the country and the creation of a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo. These fears were based on a number of factors:

In 1992, the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia held a referendum in which they strongly supported the autonomy of the areas with a majority Albanian population. Some regions went as far as to declare autonomy – the so-called Republika Vevčani and the Albanian Autonomous Republic of Ilirida declared their autonomy in 1992.[58]

The resistance of the ethnic Albanians against Serbian hegemony in Kosovo resulted in the de facto secession of the province from the FRY; the transitional status of Kosovo as an international protectorate and the possibility of independence (as eventually happened

[58] Despite the result of the referendum, the question remains as to whether the Greater Albania project had actual support in Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia. Such moves did not have the support of the majority of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and some leaders rejected any attempts to partition the country. Another question is whether the concept of a Greater Albania is supported by ethnic Albanians in neighbouring countries. According to a United Nations Development Programme study (UNDP, 2006: 16), the concept of a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo is only supported by a handful of Albanians. Rusi (in Karabeg, 2001) points out that the party whose agenda was based on the unification of all Albanians participated in local elections in Kosovo in September 2000 and failed to win a single seat. A similar party made it to the second round but remained a minor party in Kosovo. A similar fate was met by a party whose goal was the unification of all Albanians and which took part in the elections held in Albania in June 2001. This party, too, fared very poorly.

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in February 2008) contributed to the revival of the idea of a Greater Albania or at least a Greater Kosovo in certain ethnic Albanian circles. Pressure from the west caused the Kosovo leadership and Albanian government to reject such expansionist ideas.[59]

The NLA in Macedonia was receiving support from ethnic Albanian insurgent groups in neighbouring countries: the KLA[60] and UCPMB from bases in southern Serbia. The declared goal of the UCPMB was to annex the southern Serbian municipalities of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac to Kosovo, and perhaps to unite Kosovo with territories in northern Macedonia; these links between the NLA and the KLA and UCPMB aroused suspicions among the ethnic Macedonians that the goal of the NLA was to create a new Albanian entity.

There is concrete evidence that by driving out ethnic Macedonians from north-western Macedonia, the NLA was involved in ethnic cleansing; the formation of an ethnic homogenous (Albanian) territory in Macedonia, which was separated from Albanians in Kosovo and Albania by an unguarded border, was reason enough for ethnic Macedonians to suspect that the Albanians were getting ready for unification.[61]

Analyses of socio-economic factors in Macedonia after its independence are not encouraging for the country's stabilisation and success. Macedonia's GDP has not grown as it could have, primarily because of the tensions with Greece. Changes brought about

[59] See, for example, the statement by the Albanian Foreign Minister on August 15, 2001, and of the Foreign Minister and Defence Minister on October 1, 2001 (RFE/RL Newsline v Gabrič, 2006: 145).

[60] Even though the KLA was disbanded in 1999 on the basis of an agreement with the international community, it retained a large arsenal of arms and equipment.

[61] The OSCE accused the NLA of attempting to ethnically cleanse northern Macedonia. An OSCE study reported that ethnic Macedonians were under extreme pressure, faced kidnappings, and were deprived of freedom and suffered other forms of intimidation (Gabrič, 2006: 145).

by the transition signified negative development trends, e.g. the asymmetrical development of regions and the increasing inequality within Macedonian society. Inefficient privatisation and economic restructuring negatively affected the country's economic strength; this resulted in retrenchment, increasing poverty levels, and a lower standard of living. These factors hampered economic and social security, which were expected to improve with the transition to a market economy and democracy.[62] On the other hand, it was also expected that civil society, democratic institutions, political pluralism and market reforms would thrive before long, and these developments have not been realized. Meanwhile, the relative numbers of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians increased and decreased respectively, which caused uncertainty and mistrust between the two ethnic communities.

Resolution of the conflict (the Ohrid Agreement)

When armed conflict broke out in Macedonia, the country was in the process of being admitted to various international organisations and institutions, and the newly-emerging political class made clear their aim that Macedonia should become a full member of the European Union (EU) and NATO.[63] Such foreign policy goals helped establish constructive relations with international mediators, particularly with NATO, EU and OSCE representatives. International mediators facilitated the Ohrid Agreement, which represents the broadest base for the improvement of the political, cultural, social, and

[62] Economic and social security are two elements of a multi-dimensional approach towards the modern concept of security as developed by the Copenhagen school. See Buzan et al (1998).

[63] Macedonia has been a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace since 1995. It was the first country in the region to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union.

economic status of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.[64] The Agreement includes provisions for Albanian to become a co-official language where it is spoken by over 20% of the population; an equitable number of ethnic Albanians in the police force; reinforcement of the powers of units of local self-government in political decision-making; also significant is the amendment to the Preamble of the Constitution which grants sovereignty to all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia rather than to the Macedonian nation (Framework Agreement, 2001).

The Ohrid Agreement (ibid.) anticipated that parliamentary elections would be held no later than January 27, 2002, but these were postponed until September, when a list of parties headed by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) claimed victory. A coalition government was formed with an Albanian party, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), while the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, which opposed the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, was relegated to the opposition.[65] After the tragic death of president Boris Trajkovski, who died in a plane crash in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Macedonian presidential elections were won by Branko Crvenkovski of the SDSM, which was seen by the public as support for the implementation of the Ohrid

[64] The Ohrid Agreement was signed on August 13, 2001 by representatives from two Macedonian and two Albanian parties, and by special emissaries from the EU and the USA (Atanasov, 2006: 179).

[65] Dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement is also indicated in the study by the US State Department (Office of Research – Department of State v International Crisis Group, 2002: 1): in 2002, two-thirds of ethnic Macedonians were dissatisfied with the Agreement while 90% of the ethnic Albanians supported it. The rift between the Albanian and Macedonian populations at the outbreak of the conflict and before the signing of the Ohrid Agreement is illustrated by fact that 90% of the ethnic Macedonians were opposed to the amendment to the Preamble of the Constitution to the advantage of the ethnic Albanians, 98% were opposed to recognising ethnic Albanians as a constitutive nationality, 97% were opposed to bilingualism, 98% were opposed to the federalisation of the country, and 90% were opposed to an Albanian national university (Atanasov, 2001: 185). These figures illustrate the inability of Macedonian political parties to implement the changes – whichever party were to attempt to implement the changes would suffer a significant loss at the polls.

Agreement (Gabrič, 2006: 138), even though many Macedonians were strongly opposed to the Agreement.

Administrative decentralisation as anticipated by the Ohrid Agreement was crucial to progress, guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities and, consequently, the implementation of the peace agreement as a whole, as it provided a framework for the establishment of local self-government. Greater powers of the Albanians at the local level caused much dissatisfaction among some sections of Macedonian society, which was promptly exploited by opposition parties (certain Macedonians believe that the government yielded to Albanian demands at the expense of Macedonian national sovereignty; they went so far as to claim that the government sacrificed western Macedonia to its Albanian coalition partners). Opposition parties demanded a referendum on a new law that would grant Albanians greater self-government (until the introduction of parliamentary democracy, political mobilization along ethnic lines was the simplest and most dangerous way of garnering support). The international community and ruling coalition called for a boycott of the referendum because a victory for the nationalist option at the referendum would likely obstruct Macedonia's alignment with the EU and NATO. Due to a poor voter turnout, which was also the result of moves by the international community, the referendum failed.[66] An additional incentive for choosing the "European path" was the 2004 declaration, with which the parliamentary parties symbolically concluded the post-conflict period. The decision of the European Council to

[66] It should be mentioned that a few days before the referendum, the USA recognised Macedonia under the name Republic of Macedonia, which kept many voters from the referendum. The Macedonians – among whom many were convinced that the USA was undiscriminatorily supporting the Albanians – viewed the US support at a crucial time as support for the integrity of Macedonia.

grant candidate status for full EU membership to the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" on 16 December 2005 was another step towards long-term depolarisation (Gabrič, 2006: 139).[67]

Regarding the criticism that the Ohrid Agreement is merely ink on paper, Atanasov (2006: 183) points out that the Agreement is an important achievement as it stopped the bloodshed and possible outbreak of civil war. A positive outcome of the Ohrid Agreement is the political transformation of the NLA into a political party (the DUI), which won the majority of the Albanian vote in the 2002 elections.[68] In terms of security, the Ohrid Agreement facilitated the entry of a large number of ethnic Albanians into the police and military (this process is lacking with regards to quality but is an achievement in terms of quantity), and has encouraged the process of disarmament.[69]

The Ohrid Agreement gave Albanian political activities new impetus, however, the provisions were implemented slowly and interpreted primarily in the interests of political parties rather than in the interest of the Albanian community. The issue of culture is also a constituent part of the Ohrid Agreement; in this respect, Atanasov (ibid.) points out,

[67] Macedonia signed the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU on April 9, 2001 (Atanasov, 2006: 184).

[68] This was a cause of frustration among ethnic Macedonians because many important politicians of the party that was entering into a coalition government had taken up arms against the Macedonian state (Atanasov, 2006: 186).

[69] The first stage of disarmament was organised by NATO through Operation Essential Harvest, while the next stage was organised by the state in 2003 and was called Amnesty for Arms. The first stage confiscated 3,875 light weapons and the second stage confiscates 7,571. This, according to some estimates, was not a significant achievement as there are estimated to be as many as 100 thousand light weapons in Macedonia (Atanasov, 2006: 186).

Macedonia was more advanced than many European countries, particularly regarding education and the nurturing of Albanian traditions and practices. Whatever the case, Albanian became the co-official language in areas where it is spoken by over 20% of the population and is now also spoken in parliament. Official personal documents for Macedonia' Albanian-speaking citizens can now also be issued in the Albanian language. New schoolbooks have been introduced and a new private university (Southeast University of Tetovo) has been chartered and is operating successfully.

Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis of the armed ethnic conflict in Macedonia which took place in the spring of 2001 and which can be classified as the type of internal conflict that emerged after the Cold War, we can conclude the following:

- An important consequence of the radical geostrategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic changes that took place after 1990 is the shift from international to internal conflict, as has been the case in Macedonia.
- The study shows that the "hot" phase of armed conflict in Macedonia was curbed in a relatively short time. One of the main reasons for this was the uncompromising support by the international community and its main agents in the region (the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, USA and others). The conflict reached a latent phase and the signing of a formal and legal framework (the Ohrid Agreement), which anticipates an improvement of the overall status of the Albanian population in Macedonia. Tensions were reduced but the basic contradictions and causes for the outbreak of the conflict were not eliminated. In

view of this, it can be concluded that, for some ethnic Macedonians, the Ohrid Agreement widened the rift between the two ethnic communities as it has been interpreted as being too concessionary to the Albanians.

- Under certain conditions, the conflict in Macedonia, which is now in a latent phase, can again become acute and manifest. An important argument in support of the assertion that Macedonia is still far from resolving the fundamental differences between the two ethnic communities is the fact that Macedonia underwent a serious political crisis in early 2008 which arose from accusations by the Albanian coalition partners that the Ohrid Agreement is being implemented too slowly.
- It follows from the analysis that corruption and organised crime are important factors hindering the stabilisation of the country and contributing towards the sense of ethnic inequality. These two phenomena are common to Macedonia and the wider region (Kosovo).
- Recent political changes in the immediate vicinity (e.g. the declaration of independence by Kosovo) render the stabilisation of Macedonia more difficult. In this regard, there are two issues that represent possible future problems: firstly, at the NATO summit in Bucharest in the spring of 2008, Macedonia was not invited to join the organisation, whose mechanisms and policies could make a significant contribution to the stabilisation of Macedonia and other countries of the Western Balkans; and secondly, the unresolved dispute with Greece renders the stabilisation of Macedonia more difficult.

- Recent topical literature on conflict prevention and management (e.g. Kaldor, 2006; Väyrynen, 2003, and others) emphasises that post-Cold War internal conflicts often create new rules, redefine borders and expose problems associated with ethnic identification. It should be emphasized that in order to find an overall solution to this complex ethnic conflict (with its linguistic, political, identity, socio-economic, and other dimensions) at a time when Macedonia is in a latent phase, it would be necessary to ensure two things: a) the will and consensus of all sections of the political class (both Macedonian and Albanian), as well as other parts of society, to establish a cultural and civilizational framework that would enable the further development of multiculturalism, and b) the readiness of neighbouring countries and the entire international community, including international governmental and non-governmental organisations (the EU, UN, NATO, OSCE, etc.) and others interested in stabilising the region, to ensure immediate political, economic and other support that would facilitate stabilisation, mutual accommodation and compromise, and the creation of the highest possible common denominator arrangements between the ethnic communities for continued cohabitation in a single country.

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